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## PROFESSOR SCHÜRER ON LIFE UNDER THE JEWISH LAW <sup>1</sup>.

I MUCH appreciate the generous welcome with which this Society greeted the proposal of a Jewish member to read a paper on Life under the Pharisaic Law. I have nothing very fresh to tell you; indeed my purpose is rather to protest that what has already been said by Jewish apologists should have been wholly overlooked by Prof. Schürer in the new edition of his great book. I may claim one accidental qualification for my present task. I have lived, and in a sense still live, under the Pharisaic Law myself. I have felt its limitations, I have groaned under its lack of sensibility to all that we call aesthetic. I have resented its narrowness, its nationalism, on the one hand, and its claim to the Jew's undivided allegiance on the other. It does not apply to all men, yet it asks the whole man when it does apply to him. But I have also known the Law's manifold joys, its power of hallowing life, its sturdy inculcation of right, its sobriety of discipline, its laudable attempt to associate ritual with heart service, its admission that the spirit giveth life, its refusal to accept that the letter killeth. I have known men devoted to the minutest ritual details, yet simple, spiritual, saintly. Thus I have enough sympathy with the Law to do it justice, not enough sympathy to do it the injustice of unqualified flattery. The scorn and indignation of Jesus rouse answering echoes in my own consciousness, as in the

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Society of Historical Theology at Oxford on Feb. 2, 1899.

consciousness of all honest Jews. But many modern theologians go far beyond Jesus in their onslaught upon Pharisaic legalism. They accept the letter of his attack, but reject its spirit. He criticized the defects of the Law, they attribute a double dose of original sin to the very Law itself, under which Jesus was nurtured and from which he derived so much inspiration. A Jew has a ready heart for the reproof of Jesus, he cannot tolerate the Pauline doctrine that the Law is the strength of sin. There were many failures among the observers of the law, but the cause of the failure was not always the Law itself. As Prof. Wallace writes: "This we may be sure of, that Judaism would not have lasted through the fearful ordeal of mediaevalism, had it not been something nobler than a mere system of rules, codified into endless multiplicity of detail. Do not let us abuse the Law because of the lawyers (some of whom must be bad); or charge the righteous with the petty conceits of Pharisaism." To this I add, that the life which I have lived under the Law convinces me that Prof. Cheyne is right in asserting that amidst the thorns of legalism there are delightful blooms, the efflorescence of the religious spirit of Judaism. Against Prof. Schürer's judgment based on books, I can protest an experience based on life. Literature may be a criticism of life, but in cases such as this, life is also a criticism of literature.

Of course I do not maintain that a theologian is disqualified from criticizing the Law unless he be born and bred in the Synagogue. But there is no other branch of research in which the evidence of facts is so disregarded as in the science of theology. Here we deal with principles which affect men's lives, and we rarely turn to those lives as the touchstone by which to judge our principles. Rabbinic theology is concerned not with an extinct race or a primitive and obsolete theory of being. The race now numbers more individuals than when Jesus moved on earth, the devotion to the theory is greater now than

ever. Hence, the theologian who would understand the Pharisees must cast an occasional glance into the life of Judaism to-day. And it is not as though Schürer's criticism assumes merely the function of a criticism of books or even of actions. It is a criticism of motives and feelings, of the heart and mind as well as of the social organism. Surely the outsider ought to attach some importance to the evidence of insiders on questions which strike to the inmost root of being. The only reason for refusing to listen to Jews about Judaism, as it actually affects their consciousness and their conscience, would be a conviction that Jews cannot be trusted as witnesses, that they are sure to perjure themselves in order to win a dialectical victory. But this is a charge which Schürer—who has few scruples of charity where the Pharisees are concerned—evidently hesitates to bring. The evidence tendered by Jews must indeed be severely cross-examined, but it should be heard. An even more serious charge against Schürer and the scholars who blindly follow him is this. Granted that they are justified in founding their criticism of the Law on books, they ought at least to read the books. I think that this Oxford Society will go with me in holding that the critics of the Law should qualify themselves to read the originals of the documents on which they rely. Now Prof. Schürer seems to confess that he has no first-hand knowledge of the Rabbinical writings. This confession I infer externally from his citing the Mishnah from translations and from his omission of the original texts of Mishnah and Talmud from his splendid lists of authorities, and internally from his limited knowledge and actual mistakes. This fact, that Schürer relies on second-hand sources, accounts for the remarkable coincidence that the whole of the section which deals with "Das Leben unter dem Gesetz" is exactly and verbally reproduced from his former edition. A stray reference or two have been added, and a phrase has been modified in a foot-note. But in all these years he has not felt impelled

to revise a single syllable of this, the most dogmatic chapter of his great work. "Littera scripta manet." This would have been simply impossible were Schürer a real student of Rabbinical literature. That literature is so vast, so difficult, so ill-arranged, so beset with contrary currents, that no real student of it but would find himself constantly compelled to re-examine his material, to recast his conclusions, to amend, to modify, to reconsider, to add, to retract. Besides, an opinion about the Rabbinical theology sometimes depends on an impression derived from extensive reading of the Talmud as a whole, not from particular passages cited by controversialists. And what is the second-hand material to which Schürer so often trusts? Prof. Dalman in his new work, *Die Worte Jesu*, severely censures the mechanical reliance placed by modern theologians on the very class of writers references to whom form the staple of Schürer's notes. Jewish students have been crying this out in the wilderness for many a long year. Perhaps a hearing will be given now to Dalman's vigorous plea against dilettantism—I use Dalman's own word—in the ranks of Christian critics of Rabbinism. Lightfoot, Schöttgen, Eisenmenger, Wettstein, and even the canonical Weber, are all pronounced obsolete or inadequate by Dalman. Yet if you take these sources away, what is left to most theologians who write on the religion of the Pharisees?

It is, I can assure you, not a pleasant duty to speak adversely of Schürer's great work. There is a Rabbinic proverb, "Into a well from which thou hast drunk water, cast no stones." I am deeply indebted to Schürer, as every student of his period must be. His new edition converts a great book into an even greater. My admiration for it is not measured or conditioned by my opinion of the one particular section to which I am devoting myself this evening. Schürer is a prince of bibliographers, an ideal critic and historian. He is learned, he is judicious, and only occasionally dogmatic enough to refuse to modify

a literary opinion such as e.g. on the authenticity of the *Vita Contemplativa*. But when he deals with the Pharisaic Law his learning becomes antiquated, and his judgment biassed. His mind is closed against new impressions. Even where his statements have been directly challenged he does not so much as refer to his challengers. He has been taken to task for mistranslations; these remain unaltered. The facts of actual life under the Law have been brought to his notice; he has refused to listen. The heading "Irrwege" still figures as the title of one of Schürer's subdivisions on the Law. Wrong ways indeed the Rabbis trod, but they never strayed into the "Irrwege" which Prof. Schürer attributes to them.

Let me first point to some specific mistakes in which Prof. Schürer has persisted. He had a whole chapter on the "Reinheitsgesetze," in which he enumerates the baleful effects of these laws of ritual cleanness on the daily life of the Jews. But Mr. Montefiore in his criticism of Schürer adduced strong evidence to show that these laws applied only to priests and to laymen visiting the temple; that under normal circumstances laymen might contract uncleanness without scruple. He further argues, and I quite agree with him, that all "those distinctions respecting the various capacities of different utensils to contract uncleanness, over which Prof. Schürer makes merry . . . are merely the precipitate of the discussions of the schools, and were probably unknown to nine-tenths of the pious and observant Israelites in the age of Christ." Of this serious criticism Schürer takes no note, yet it is obvious that if true, as I hold it is, it vitiates much of Schürer's argument. Maimonides even contends that the laws of uncleanness were designed to "keep people away from the Sanctuary, and to prevent them from entering it whenever they liked." In other words these ritual minutiae were a safeguard against the danger of making a mechanical ritual use of the Temple.

Even worse is it with Schürer's treatment of the Rabbinic

legislation regarding vows and oaths. He not only ignores the patent facts that Jesus' famous "Yea, yea; Nay, nay" is exactly paralleled in the Talmud, that the Rabbis held the breach of one's spoken word as grievous a sin as idolatry, that such an offence estranged the offender from the Divine presence; not only does Schürer refuse to notice this side of the oath question at all, but on the basis of assured mistranslations he founds the charge that the Pharisees departed from morality and ignored the "Höchste Pietätspflicht" in the matter of vows and oaths (pp. 493-4). To prove the former charge Schürer cites the Mishnah Shebuoth iv. 13, but he confounds *patur*, i. e. free from legal penalty, with *mutar*, i. e. morally lawful. To prove the second charge he adduces Mishnah Nedarim ix. 1, which he both mistranslates and misinterprets. These errors have been long ago brought to Schürer's notice by Prof. Schechter, but the passage remains unaltered in Schürer's new edition.

This is the method not of the historian but of one determined to formulate an indictment. Schürer does not criticize the Law, he condemns it. He passes the severest sentence without any recommendation to mercy. Why should he be merciful when he can see no extenuating circumstances? He does not analyse the good and evil of the Rabbinic system, for to him it is wholly evil. Toy and Wendt agree that Jesus was directing his anger at exceptional villains, but Schürer, when he condescends for a moment to admit that there were a few good Pharisees, proceeds at once to qualify his admission by a vigorous repetition of his general condemnation. And what a condemnation it is! The Jew obeyed the Law from the meanest motives of reward, his religious and moral life was completely externalized, his conscience was silenced, he could not distinguish between the highest moral truth and the trivialities of a ceremonial ritual. Formal accuracy in carrying out the law, not the doing of the good as such, was the end aimed at. The Jew was crushed under a

burden of duties; the Sabbath and everything else was subjected to the minutest and most wearisome regulations. Even prayers were only uttered to fulfil a duty, and thus all living piety was destroyed. Fasting was an externalized means of putting pressure on God. A composition with the letter of the Law was sought at the sacrifice of honesty. At every step, at every hour, throughout his life, the Jew was tortured by dead and deadening formulas. Life was a torment to the earnest man, while those who attained to mastership in the Law almost inevitably sank into the vice of pride and self-righteousness. And this is Prof. Schürer's whole account of Life under the Law! In his *Apologetics*, if I remember aright, Dr. Bruce discusses Jewish legalism as one of God's experimental failures in the evolution of a perfect religion. If Prof. Schürer has given a true account of that legalism, the experiment must have been devised not by God but by the devil.

Underlying Prof. Schürer's whole case against the Pharisaic religion is the assumption that a life of the spirit is incompatible with a very fully developed ritual. He makes little effort to prove that this incompatibility actually manifested itself; he rather assumes it as a logical necessity. Because the letter often casts out the spirit, he concludes that letter and spirit can never nest together. But there is no church without ritual, letter and spirit always coexist. That ritual meets a real need of the spirit, follows from its universality in all forms of religion. The question as to the result of the combination of spirit and letter can therefore never be solved *a priori*, but must in each case be submitted to the test of experience and of fact.

Schürer, assuming *a priori* that spirit and letter are mutually exclusive, is incapable of putting Rabbinism to this test. He cannot find anything spiritual in Rabbinism, because he has decided that nothing spiritual can be there. And when anything that betokens inwardness forces itself upon his notice, he feels justified, nay bound, to explain it



away. Christian theologians give to every saying of Jesus the widest and most generous extension that the sayings can possibly bear. And it is right to do so. No Jew should seek to belittle any of the great and inspiring utterances of the Prince of Peace. The world must make the most and not the least of its spiritual treasures. But when a Rabbi says a good thing, theologians will only allow to it the minimum of meaning that the words extort from them. On the one side generosity, on the other grudging. It would need, however, the whole evening to illustrate this double dealing as between the Law and the Gospel. We are told that the Jewish God was a King exacting homage, but when the Gospel uses the Jewish expression "the Kingdom of Heaven," Dr. Fairbairn rightly points out that the Divine paternity and the Divine sovereignty are complementary ideas. The Jewish God is far off because he is located in heaven, but when the Lord's prayer addresses "our father in heaven," Canon Gore comments, "not in heaven because he is far off, but because he is raised above all the ignorance and pollution of man." The Jew, we are told, had a communal not a personal soul, but when the Lord's prayer opens "*our* father," Mr. Gore remarks, "I must begin with losing my selfishness, with recollecting that I am only one of the great body of God's children." But not only are Rabbinic expressions pressed against Rabbinism with an uncritical rigour, but its good things are treated with the sneer of the special pleader. When in the *Pirke Aboth* Antigonus of Socho said, "Be not as slaves that minister to the master with a view to receive recompense," Schürer declares that this "is by no means a correct expression of the ground principle of Pharisaic Judaism." Marti, by the way, calls the same saying "*abnorm.*" This is like the Bible critics who pronounce Jonah a freak, but Esther typically Jewish. Yet Jonah is read in every Synagogue on the day of Atonement, and Antigonus' saying is more often on a Jewish preacher's lips than any other Rabbinic maxim.

Again, when R. Eleazer inveighs against those who make of prayer an appointed duty, a denunciation repeated over and over again in the Rabbinic literature, Schürer brushes it aside as an inconsistency. It is an inconsistency with Pharisaic Judaism as it is conceived by Schürer, not with Pharisaic Judaism as it really is. Just as the writers of some of the most spiritual Psalms in the Psalter loved the Temple and its ritual with an intense affection, just as Hillel could present at once the ideal of spirituality and the ideal of devotion to the technicalities of legalism, just as in mediaeval times Ibn Gebirol could write that purest, most spiritual of meditations, "the Royal Crown" and then proceed to draw up a metrical survey of the 613 commandments of the Pentateuch, so have I known a modern Jew, who refused to knock at his own door on the Sabbath, yet died in early manhood a martyr to his spiritual aspirations. This is the essential fact about the Jewish legalism. Together with the trivial, the legal, the ritual, which Schürer treats as the whole of Pharisaism, there were the spiritual, the ennobling, the joyous elements which Schürer discards as abnormal or inconsistent.

Many Pharisees undoubtedly held an external view of the Law as something imposed from without, and they regarded themselves as bound to obey it because it was the Law. This unfortunately applies to all revealed religions, for the ideal "Not my will but thine" is to many Christians an ideal, I fear, only because it is written in a text. But the external view of the Law was not the final statement of the belief of the higher Jewish mind. The Pharisees attempted to reduce the Law to general principles. One expounded it as the outcome of such fundamental morals as "Love thy neighbour as thyself." Another held that the Law was summed up in the great saying of Micah, "What does the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." This betokened a sense that the Law itself required a sanction. In his new treatise *Die Ethik des Judenthums*,

Prof. Lazarus offers ample proof that some Rabbis held the Law not moral because it was commanded, but commanded because it was moral. The commandments were not commandments because they were written, but they were written because they were commandments. So when pre-existent, creative wisdom is in Ben Sira identified with the Law, the Law is law because it flows from the fount of wisdom, not wise because it is Law. Hence, again, the doctrine found in early Rabbinical writings that the Law was revealed because it was necessary, not necessary because it was revealed. There were laws indeed which were only known from revelation—these were the ceremonies, but there were laws which, without revelation, man must have discovered for himself. These included the fundamentals of social morals, the prohibition of murder, robbery, adultery. Schürer seems to be quite oblivious of this distinction, but it became an established principle in Jewish theology. Maimonides explains it in the sixth of his eight chapters on Ethics, while Ibn Ezra in his *Foundation of Morals* distinguishes as primary those laws of morality which are ingrained in the human heart and not derived from revelation. Though one usually thinks of the Decalogue as the expression of revelation *par excellence*, Ibn Ezra actually includes among the primary, self-discoverable laws the whole of the Decalogue with the exception of the ordinance of the Sabbath. To Ibn Ezra there were three revelations, of God in nature, of God in the conscience, of God in the Law.

There was another idea which helped to save the Law from becoming a merely mechanical system, and this idea was already to the fore in Pharisaic Judaism. Prof. Schürer says nothing of the spiritualizing effect of the idea of the *Imitatio Dei*, which pervades the Rabbinical theology. God is holy, be thou holy; God is merciful, be thou merciful. It has, perhaps truly, been said, that only a Christian can understand a Christian's passion for Christ. I think that only a Jew knows the Jew's passion for God,

the depth of his love, the joy of his service. To God the Pharisee ascribed all the virtues; stern justice, the tenderest mercy; God was the object of reverence, the object of love; king, saviour, father; the monarch on high, the familiar friend on earth. Man's ideal was to attain to something of the Godly nature, and the Law was the means to that end. The Pharisee's love for it led him to childish absurdities, to the most trivial excesses. But so conceived, on the one hand as the expression of the divine will, on the other as the expression of man's moral nature, the Law brought the human soul into relation with God, and it could never become the mere code of external observances which it seems to Schürer. "An unchaste thought is a sin;" "the thought of sin is even worse than sin itself." "The All-Merciful desires man's heart" ran another familiar phrase. The inwardness of the religious ideal is brought out in the comments of the Sifre on the text, "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart. With all thy heart, with thy good and evil inclinations, let not thy heart be divided but whole towards God. . . . With all thy soul. Love him even to the surrender of thy soul. . . . With all thy might. Whatever measure God metes out to thee, be it the measure of happiness, be it the measure of sorrow, love him with all thy might." But perhaps this religious inwardness comes out best in such a passage as the following Pesikta: "Good and upright is the Lord, therefore will he instruct sinners in the way. They asked wisdom what is the punishment of the sinner? Wisdom answered, Evil shall pursue him. They asked prophecy and were told, The soul that sinneth shall die. They asked the Law. The Law said, Let him bring a trespass offering and be absolved. They asked God himself. God answered, What is the punishment of the sinner? Let him repent of his sin and receive my pardon."

All this did not save average Judaism from the pitfall of mechanical obedience, but it was a constant corrective to the danger and was by no means without effect. The

Archbishop of Canterbury, in his Charge, argues that the Pharisee did good but was not good, that he always applied a rule, and thus experienced none of that moral struggle which accompanies the application of the conscience to questions of morality. But this is no argument against Pharisaism, it simply is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory of the nature of Rabbinism which the Archbishop shares with Schürer. The Pharisee had his moral conflicts, like every other human being; duties sometimes pulled him two ways, and for all such cases he had no guide but his own sense of right or wrong, his own moral nature built up by obedience to the Law. Detailed as the Jewish Law was, it did not, it could not, prescribe in advance for a tithe of the moral decisions that he must daily make. "But," Prof. Schürer would reply, "I am not so sure of that. Even the prayers were minutely controlled, and if the prayers why not the conscience?" Certainly there were many prescriptions as to the hour at which the Shema might be said, and the liturgical ordinances were sufficiently comprehensive. But again this is not the whole truth. There was some fluidity in the *contents* of the liturgy. In the Talmud there are numerous private prayers which were composed and used by individual Rabbis. Just as at an earlier date new Psalms easily found their way into the Canon, so, right up to the age of printing, new hymns found their way into the Synagogue. The Midrash on Psalm 4 says, "Pray in the synagogue, or in the field, or in thy house, or on thy bed, or if thou canst not pray on thy bed, let thy heart meditate a prayer and be thou silent. Be silent from the sin thou wast about, and if thou dost this, what says the text in the next verse: Offer sacrifices of righteousness. I shall esteem it as though thou hadst built an altar and offered thereon a multitude of sacrifices." In a score of places the Pharisaic Rabbis insist that prayer must be heart, not lip worship. All this did not save many Jews from praying mechanically, from using words without thought. Worse still was this when

Hebrew, though not familiarly known, remained the language of the liturgy. But the Synagogue has hardly done worse in this respect than the Roman Catholic Church. The fault must not be entirely assigned to the Law. It is a fault incident to all liturgies. You bid man pray when his heart dictates, but you fix an hour for public worship. You put the words into the mouth of him who prays, yet you ask him to pray as though the words were his own. You wish him to use his heart, yet you are bound to give him a prayer-book. Even in churches where there is no fixed liturgy, I am told that after a few weeks' experience of the pastor, a watchful member can perfectly well anticipate the exact formulae which the pastor's extemporized outpourings will use. Happily for Church and Synagogue alike, we can always fall back on the Psalter which use cannot stale nor blunt. One would almost suppose from Schürer that the Pharisees had forgotten the Psalms.

Externalism, according to Schürer, attached even to the motives and the results of obedience to the Law. The Pharisee obeyed because he expected rewards, but he felt obedience to be a grievous burden. And the expectation was of the most arithmetical and mechanical character. Forcing against him a metaphor which is echoed also in the Gospels, the critic tells the Pharisee that he was a chafferer who basely demanded God's tat for his own tit. Like Robinson Crusoe he cast up accounts of profit and loss ; so many good works, so much rewards. It is not easy to reconcile this picture with the theory usually raised on the authority of James ii. 10, that the Pharisees considered a single failure in obedience sufficient to undo all their piety, sufficient to rob all their piled-up works of their saving value. The Pharisees indeed held that righteousness would be rewarded, they held act and consequence to be causally connected. They could not conceive God as just and yet indifferent to the justice of man's conduct. Moreover they believed in the Covenant,

and steadfastly trusted in God's fidelity to it. But their theory of Retribution did not begin and end with the principle of measure for measure. God's fidelity to the Covenant was an act of divine grace, calling for Israel's responsive obedience but not signed or sealed by Israel's merits. They held that God rewarded, but that man must not serve him because of the reward. The saying of Antigonos which Schürer thinks abnormal underlies the whole Rabbinic theology. "He who fulfils a commandment and expects a reward is a sinner." "None shall do the commandments to win reward, but all that ye do must be done from love." "Blessed is the man who delighteth in his commandments. R. Joshua ben Levi says the meaning is that man only desires to do the commandments but does not want the rewards connected with them." Add to this the remarkable Rabbinical doctrine of the Chastisements of Love, and the evidence is complete that though the Pharisees believed that in a just world God must proportion happiness to merit, must indeed pay measure for measure, yet they were not slaves who served God for reward. This conclusion is fully confirmed by the Jewish liturgy. If the Covenant is appealed to it is not on the ground of present righteousness, but on the ground of the idealized righteousness of the fathers. Man is always described in the Jewish liturgy as utterly empty of works, as altogether destitute of righteousness, and as dependent for salvation solely and only on the infinite mercies of God. I will spend fewer words still over Schürer's other count. He thinks that the Law was a burdensome yoke. The controversy is again between logic and fact. Logic is with Schürer, fact is with the Law. *A priori*, obedience to the Rabbinic Law should have been unspeakably wearisome, actually it was an ineffable joy. Against Schürer's logic there is the evidence of twenty-five centuries of Jewish literature, liturgy, and life. The most wondrous feature of life under the Law—its irrepressible joyousness—is obliterated by Schürer by a stroke of the pen.

In my criticism of Prof. Schürer I have more or less followed Mr. Montefiore's and Prof. Schechter's lines. The gravamen of my charge is that Schürer's third edition is in this section identical with the second, that the criticism levelled against it has been entirely unnoticed. It is true that any revision would have been very inconvenient. These chapters of Schürer have been so extensively used and relied on, that were Schürer to admit himself wrong in any point, he would upset the structures of many a disciple and copyist.

Is this to go on? Is the Law to be searched for no other purpose than to find justifications for Paul? Are the Rabbinical sayings to be examined simply as foils to the Gospel? Or is the Law to be studied as a whole, with no other aim than to get at the truth, to understand its excellences *on its own lines* as well as its notorious faults when absolute tests are applied? The only book in which I have read a real attempt to get at the truth about the effects of the Law on Jewish life and character is Anatole Leroy Beaulieu's *Israel among the Nations*. He castigates the Jews, but he discriminates. Jews do not expect a wholly favourable verdict, they do not expect that the Law will be pronounced an altogether good thing. They know themselves that it is not an altogether good thing, they do not believe at all in religious finality. But Jews have the right to demand that there shall be what Prof. Cheyne calls a fresh investigation of essential Judaism. This investigation must be made by Christians if it is to win due authority; most Jews indeed who are thoroughly conversant with the Talmud know nothing of current theology. But the investigation must be made by men who will study faithfully the original sources, who will immerse themselves in the Rabbinic world and know its highways and byways as they know their own city, who will at every turn test their theories by comparison with actual results in the Jewish life of the past and of to-day. These investigators, if they refuse the evidence



of Jewish lovers of the Law, must also refuse the evidence of those who hate the Law, whether these adversaries be canonical Apostles or German Professors. Why is it that a man like Mr. Montefiore has been moved to such unwonted heat when dealing with Schürer's charges against the Law? It was because the Law is criticized with a harshness, a one-sidedness, an ignorance, an injustice seldom paralleled in the history of theology. What would you think were a Jew to tell you that the war of ritual now raging in the English Church is a war of external ceremonies, and that this is the only subject that really interests Anglican Christians? Yet this is how the Pharisees are treated. That my complaint is just you may see from this. I and many Jews with me have no resentment whatever against the general spirit of the criticism to which the Law was subjected by Jesus, against his healthy onslaught against externalism. When Jesus overturned the money-changers and ejected the sellers of doves from the Temple he did a service to Judaism for which Judaism may one day be adequately grateful. But were the money-changers and the dove-sellers the only people who visited the Temple? And was every one who bought or sold a dove a mere formalist? Last Easter I was in Jerusalem, and along the façade of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre I saw the stalls of the vendors of sacred relics, of painted beads and inscribed ribbons, of coloured candles, gilded crucifixes, and bottles of Jordan water. There these Christians babbled and swayed and bargained, a crowd of buyers and sellers in front of the Church sacred to the memory of Jesus. Would, I thought, that Jesus were come again to overthrow these false servants of his, even as he overthrew his false brothers in Israel long ago. But I will also tell you what I did not think. I did not think that the buying and selling of sacred relics was the sole motive which had brought thousands of pilgrims to Jerusalem, I did not say, Here is the whole of the Gospel, this is its inevitable end, its sure outcome. I knew that

there is more in Christianity than this, that there are other Christians than these. Nay, as I turned away I thought that perhaps if I had the insight to track a dealer in relics to his inmost soul, I might after all find there a heart warm with the love of Christ.

I ABRAHAMS.